Let's shove aside the one game for a little while, because this is really about the big picture. It's time for a change at the highest levels of Clemson baseball, for a number of compelling reasons. Clemson baseball is currently led not by a manager, but by a tactician. By a man hell-bent on interjecting himself and his philosophy into offensive and defensive situations that would have been better left to their own devices.
In judging baseball managers, I tend to follow the Bill James philosophy. As with most things about baseball, Bill James knows more about managerial capability than any human being living, past or present. James wrote a book and hundreds of essays on the topic, but it's one James quote that sums up the problem with Clemson tactician Jack Leggett in succinct and direct fashion.
"I believe that Joe McCarthy was the greatest manager in baseball history,'' Bill James declares -- not because McCarthy led seven world championship clubs, but because he could adapt: he never let the game pass him by. Early in his career he had no use for relief pitchers, but by 1935 he was sending Johnny Murphy of the Yankees to the bull pen -- the first instance of a pitcher who was pitching well being asked to work there.
-Charlie Rubin on Bill James, 1997.
So here we are. Anyone paying even a minuscule amount of attention has seen the downward baseball trend. You might not realize just how ugly things are, though. The case for replacing Jack Leggett with someone capable of managing a baseball team has many fronts, starting with what Bill James wrote so eloquently about in his book.
Refusal to change and modify his approach
James had a tremendous amount of respect for Joe McCarthy because the former Yankee skipper understood that the game is simple, yet complex. McCarthy molded the original edition of the "Bronx Bombers" to 5 championships in 6 seasons, blending beautifully the beginning of the Joe DiMaggio era with the ending of Lou Gherig's historic career. He was a visionary at the core. He never took his own ability to master the game too seriously, understanding instead that he could benefit from learning new methods.
This is where Jack Leggett fails most miserably. Leggett has always been synonymous with the term and philosophy of small ball. For those unfamiliar with the way of play, it basically incorporates a great deal of run manufacturing, which differs greatly from run producing. This philosophy employs sacrificing bunting, stealing bases, hit and run situations, and a host of other tactical moves championed by Jack Leggett and others.
That sounds like true, old fashioned baseball, right? Sure, in the same way that candles represent true, old fashioned American home lighting.
Tom Tango is another very smart man, and he wrote a book definitively called The Book to touch on many of these issues. A Pete Palmer preview of chapter nine (The Sacrifice Bunt) of Tango's book breaks down modern statistical findings on the sacrifice bunt. Palmer writes:
As with the stolen base (which has also declined dramatically), many GMs and managers have come to the realization that small-ball strategies, like the stolen base and sacrifice bunt, are not as effective in the high run environments prevalent in the modern era of baseball.
As well, conventional sabermetric wisdom says that the sacrifice bunt is generally an ineffective and archaic strategy. For example, the three highest-profile sabermetric teams in 2004 in the AL were Oakland, Boston, and Toronto. While the AL average for sacrifice hits per team was almost 39, Boston had only 12, Toronto 10, and Oakland 25, the three lowest totals in the league. The sacrifice bunt appears to be a strategy eschewed by sabermetric teams.
Palmer is well written on the subject himself, as he published a 1984 book called The Hidden Game of Baseball. In that work, Palmer and John Thorn wrote, "The sacrifice bunt...is a bad play. With the introduction of the lively ball, the sacrifice bunt should have vanished."
Statisticians and sabermetricians haven't quite come to a consensus on just how much a sacrifice bunt costs an offense. The consensus opinion is that teams can lose as much as a half-run, on average, every time they put on the play. The reasoning behind this is that with only 27 outs available to an offense each game, one out is much more valuable than one base. It's a game of commodities, and Clemson is among the teams giving up way too many of their most valuable commodity.
The difference are even more pronounced in college baseball over professional baseball, as well. With aluminum bats, smaller parks, and most hitters being farther along in their development than most pitchers, the sacrifice bunt becomes an even worse play in the college game.
So how does this relate to Clemson's tactician? In 2007, Clemson laid down 56 sacrifice bunts in 64 games. Among those doing the bunting were Taylor Harbin (6 sac bunts, .510 slugging %), Andy D'Allesio (3 sac bunts, .634 slugging %), Marquez Smith (4 sac bunts, .560 slugging %), Doug Hogan (2 sac bunts, .610 slugging %). None of these players has plus speed, so the option of beating out the sacrifice was not much of a consideration in any of these cases.
This season, Clemson doesn't have nearly the offensive potential that it had in 2007, but the sacrifice bunts are still there, crippling the already stagnant offensive effort. Clemson has sacrificed successfully 23 times in 31 games. This doesn't include the missed and failed sacrifices, which are substantial, but unrecorded in my data set. It should come as no surprise that two of Clemson's most productive hitters are being forced to give up outs. Ben Paulsen slugs for a .678 average, but has had to lay down 2 sac bunts. Though Kyle Parker has struggled early in the year, he and his .500+ career slugging average have been required to lay down 3 sacrifices.
This is an unacceptable trend, and it's something that has zapped Clemson's ability to produce runs at a championship level. It is part of the reason why Clemson's run production has been steadily declining over the course of this decade.
Next in order is base stealing, which Clemson has misused under Jack Leggett during the last few seasons. This is something that most baseball fans don't understand, and it's apparent that Clemson's tactician is among those individuals. People much smarter than I have concluded the following about stolen bases:
So a SB adds .353 runs per game while a CS costs .922 (Cyril Morong).
There is some debate, as well, on what rate a base stealer needs to be successful in order to add to his team's run scoring capability. The most conservative estimates put it at 72%, while some researchers have the number closer to 80%. For the sake of fairness, a 75% success rate is a good place to start for successful base stealing. Clemson has been markedly good on the base paths this season, with a success rate of 76% (38 for 50). This has not been the case during recent seasons, though.
2008:
56-81 (69%)
This included individual numbers from the following poor base stealers. At some point, one has to wonder why these guys were still getting the steal sign from the tactician.
Mike Freeman: 3-7
Jeff Schaus: 4-7
Wilson Boyd: 6-9
Doug Hogan: 10-17 - This is a catcher, stealing 17 times with a 59% success rate.
Alex Lee: 2-4
There were some examples of success, like Stan Widdman's 14-16 and John Nester/Chris Epps each going 5-6.
Here are the numbers from 2007:
62 of 94 (66%)
Proponents of the overuse of the steal play will argue that the threat of stealing offers a measure of disruption to the defense, thus allowing more hits to fall. The problem with this, of course, is that it neglects the obvious fact that hitters are human beings just like pitchers and fielders, and are thus subject to the same psychological discomfort and distraction of a bouncing runner at first base. In addition, the added worry of taking pitches to protect a stealing runner and trying to hit the ball in a certain place are detrimental to a hitter's long term success.
Leggett used the steal well in 2006, and not surprisingly, his team won more often. The problem, of course, is that the tactician has shown no ability to alter his approach, and has shown no willingness to understand the idea that running slow runners into sure outs is a sure way to lose baseball games in large number.
The heart of the first issue with Clemson's tactician is that he won't change his approach on the game of baseball. "Small ball" is a Jack Leggett staple, and a proven losing philosophy. It's something that strips runs from a team over the course of a season, yet Clemson continues to employ this strategy in the most extreme example available. The fact that a man charged with leading a once proud baseball program could be so blind to the obvious things that win baseball games is a strike against the coach. And it leads to the next problem with Jack Leggett - declining offensive trends.
Negative offensive trending
Steele Tiger of Tigerillustrated's WestZone message board put together an interesting compilation of Clemson's batting statistics during this decade, and they show an alarming trend. The splits are obviously batting average, on-base average, and slugging average, and it's clear to see that Clemson isn't doing a lot of things right lately. The 2009 stats were from 2 weeks ago, so they probably have changed a bit.
2009 - .283/.379/.426 and averaging 6.4 runs per game
2008 - .285/.368/.439 and averaged 6.2 runs per game
2007 - .293/.373/.450 and averaged 6.2 runs per game
2006 - .303/.380/.480 and averaged 7.0 runs per game
2005 - .305/.378/.472 and averaged 7.0 runs per game
2004 - .298/.375/.466 and averaged 6.9 runs per game
2003 - .309/.385/.444 and averaged 6.7 runs per game
2002 - .325/.411/.513 and averaged 8.2 runs per game
2001 - .305/.384/.487 and averaged 7.7 runs per game
2000 - .304/.396/.433 and averaged 7.5 runs per game
1999 - .306/.422/.473 and averaged 8.9 runs per game
1998 - .326/.434/.496 and averaged 9.0 runs per game
1997 - .314/.417/.508 and averaged 8.8 runs per game
1996 - .294/.396/.454 and averaged 7.0 runs per game
What is interesting to note is that Clemson changed hitting coaches in 2003, when Tim Corbin left Clemson for Vanderbilt.
From 1996-2002 under Tim Corbin, Clemson hit .310/.408/.480 and scored 8.1 RPG.
From 2003-2009 under Tom Riginos, Clemson has hit .296/.376/.453 and scored 6.6 RPG.
Clemson hasn't seen a signficant increase in schedule difficulty over that time span, so it's fair to compare the numbers. The sabermetric community has come up with the gem that on-base average is the single most correlating component to run production. More than sac bunting, base stealing, or anything else, having guys NOT make outs is the best way to score runs. It seems so simple, but it looks to be lost on the current coaching staff. Under Corbin, the team dipped below .400 in OBA only 3 times, with the lowest being .384. Clemson has exceeded that number only once under new hitting coach Tom Riginos, in his first season, and they've failed to do anywhere near that well lately.
What's causing this? It's all about plate approach and development. In sticking to the small ball style, Clemson's hitters are taught the virtue of constant contact and aggressiveness. They are celebrated for putting the ball in play, when they should be more selective at the plate. This is a basic philisophical problem, and there's no reason to believe it will change anytime soon. Clemson hitters get behind in the count by jumping out of their shoes at bad pitches early in the count. They are then forced to become defensive at the plate, trying to just put the ball in play when they're down in the count.
Clemson hitters don't strike out enough. Strikeouts are typically looked at with ire by baseball fans, but they aren't nearly as ugly a result as you might think. Players who strike out a lot are typically taking pitches, drawing walks, and working deep into counts. They are selective, and they don't swing at bat pitches.
In Major League Baseball last season, of the 4 NL playoff teams, they ranked as follows in team strikeouts.
Philly - 8th
Chicago - 6th
Milwaukee - 5th
Los Angeles - 13th
American League:
Tampa Bay - 2nd
Boston - 6th
Chicago - 7th
Los Angeles - 11th
Obviously, striking out is not a good thing, because it's making an out, and that's the worst result for a hitter at the plate (short of making 2 outs). But the evidence exists that teams that strike out a little bit more tend to be the more patient teams. These teams work deep into counts, get into bullpens quicker, and get better pitches to hit late in counts. Clemson batters would be better served to wait on their pitch a little bit more, instead of swinging for contact at everything that approaches the plate.
Another issue at work here is Leggett's inability to make the necessary changes to his staff. It's obvious that something is amiss with either he or Riginos, and Leggett seems reluctant to make any change here. Instead of thinking of ways to rectify an obviously downward trend, the Clemson tactician is resolved to try MORE run stealing plays instead of less, and seems averse to solutions that might actually address the problem.
Struggling against quality competition
Since the beginning of last season, Clemson is 2-26 against UGA, South Carolina, Miami, FSU, and North Carolina. None of those wins have come against South Carolina, as Clemson lost its 6th in a row to the hated rival last night. Think about 2-26 for a moment. Now, on to the really scary portion of the equation.
Folks, South Carolina baseball has passed Clemson. They, for the lack of a better phrase, own Clemson. It's not really even close, either. They've got a $30 million baseball facility that rivals the best places to play in the country, they've recruited a team with strengths suited for that ball park, and they are preparing ball players for the professional ranks more effeciently than Clemson is at this moment. These are the facts, and they're not pretty. There is no reason to think this is about to reverse itself in the near future, either.
If Clemson can't do better than a 7% winning mark against quality competition, it shouldn't be fielding a team. For a program that used to expect to sweep bad teams and beat the good ones, this is simply unacceptable.
Convoluted recruiting approach
One of the major issues with the Clemson tactician is his recruiting outlook and overall plan, if there is one. Clemson's roster has 33 players. Of those 33, 11 are from the state of South Carolina. Personally, I could care less if the players came from Gaffney or China, as long as they can hit, run, and throw, but Leggett seems to be scouring the far reaches of the country to find guys who look like him and play like him.
What this has led to is a small team that can't hit. He recruits players who can put the ball in play, but can't drive it for power to all fields. There are exceptions, of course, but this is a growing trend. While future Major League all-stars like Matt Weiters and Justin Smoak make their plays for Clemson's rivals, Leggett is looking to places like Cooperstown, New York to fill out his roster. Who has ever heard of baseball in a vacation retreat like that?
In all seriousness, Clemson's recruiting approach must change. Some people like to bring up Leggett's troubles with losing players to the draft, but evaluating that part of the recruiting mix is his job. He needs to know which players are going to go pro and which are not. Leggett has be able to recruit players whose talent butts right up to the pro-ready line, but doesn't quite exceed it. At current standing, the Tiger tactician is not doing that.
It is also time to begin questionning why Clemson loses so many players to the draft. It has a lot to do with the fact that the Clemson coaching staff does little to develop the talent that they have at Clemson. Take a player like Chris Epps, for instance, who came in with a draft pedigree and some good raw skills. He has an exceptional combination of power potential, speed, and a solid plate approach. Last season, he posted an on-base average well over .400, despite his low batting average. He took walks and stole bases at an efficient clip. Now, he's been relegated to the bench while the offense struggles. His skills have not been developed in any fashion.
This is a guy who Kenny Williams of the White Sox saw enough in to spend a 20-something round draft pick on, and Clemson's staff of tacticians hasn't been able to bring the skills out in him. This is a toubling, and it's why Clemson will struggle more and more on the recruiting trail.
If I was a parent with a kid who had an opportunity to play professional baseball, I'd advise him to take the money and work with a major league appointed hitting instructor. I'd have a director of player development looking after him before I would send him to sit the bench and bunt the ball with Jack Leggett.
Pitching approach
Clemson's pitching staff is one area where a lot of focus has been placed. Clemson is recruiting pitchers more frequently. They've hired a good, young pitching coach to replace Kevin O'Sullivan. Kyle Bunn has a chance to be a great coach, but he's handicapped by some of the Tiger tactician's decisions.
Clemson's pitching staff doesn't use but one side of the plate. All too often, they pitch as if the strike zone was high and away. Coached not to use the inside part of the plate, Clemson's pitchers nibble away on the outside, often leaving fat fastballs in the middle of the plate. In a game that features small stadiums and aluminum bats, this is a bad idea. When every small second baseman from Duke or Boston College can lead out over the plate with no fear of a fastball coming into his kitchen, it should be no surprise when one of these kids extends on a flat, 88 MPH fastball and drills it 400 feet.
In general, building a team around pitching is difficult in college baseball. This is because pitching just takes longer to develop than hitting. It's why you see young hitters break into Major League Baseball with more frequency than young pitchers. At the same age, a young hitter will have an advantage over a young pitcher, given the same level of talent. So when you build your team around young, 19 year old pitching, you are asking for trouble.
In addition to that, Leggett has shown little to no ability to handle his bullpen. In a loss to top-ranked Georgia, the manager watched starter Justin Sarrat dominate and confuse UGA hitters for eight innings, only to pull him in favor of Matt Vaughn in the ninth. Sarrat had a high pitch count, but there were no signs of him laboring at all.
Last night, Leggett replaced Tomas Cruz, who had given up only one hit in four innings, with Casey Harman in the ninth inning. Harman has been bounced between starting and relieving, and has never pitched in an environment like the one he saw last night. It's the manager's job to know what his players can handle and what they can't. Cruz had it going, had his changeup working, and was locating his fastball. He was throwing three pitches for strikes and didn't show signs of fatigue. His trail leg wasn't dragging, his velocity wasn't declining, and he didn't seem to be dropping down at all. Simply put, Leggett made the call to throw an unprepared sophomore into the lion's den because he was a left hander. He micromanaged, again, and his team paid for it.
Tomas Cruz is the best reliever on the Clemson baseball team. I had watched him throw literally four pitches against Florida State when I came to this realization. That was my first viewing of the kid, and I was immediately impressed with his throwing of three different pitches for low zone strikes in his first four pitches. He has good movement on his fastball, has a nice changeup differential, and has a fair breaking pitch to compliment his plus pitch and live fastball. He also has a nice approach, and is the type of pitcher not flustered by intense pressure. But Cruz continues to catch time in low to medium leverage situations, while other pitchers get their opportunity to choke away leads. If Leggett is set on having a closer, which is pretty unnecessary in general, then he's got one made for the job. The fact that he can't see this is another strike against him.
It speaks to the overmanaging that goes on in Clemson's dugout every game. I've been careful not to call Leggett a manager, because he does very little managing. He's a micromanager, a man who is set on inserting himself and his will into every situation. In many instances, he'd be better just allowing his players to play. Instead, he focuses way too hard on trying to have them "execute" offense, when they should be producing offense. He has them wound so tight with his dogpiling antics and his go-go nature that they can't make any plays with the game on the line. Leggett needs to get out of the way, quite literally, and allow the baseball game to be played without his constant influence.
So why do we have to have a change?
Some sort of change is needed. Jack Leggett took over a great program, sustained a nice run, but only a has a couple of conference championships to his credit. The issue here is not the past, though. It's the present and the future. The program is in steady decline right now, and if nothing changes drastically soon, it will stay that way. The problem, of course, is that Leggett has no willingness or desire to change his approach. He's actually proud of his stubborn, losing philosophy, which is a very frustrating thing for people who love the game. The answers are right in front of him, but there's little chance that he will implement them.
Can Phillips make this move? Probably not. It's unlikely that he has either the gaul or the understanding to make a move with such foresight. Phillips' feel for the baseball program is akin to Leggett's feel for the coaching staff. It doesn't exist.
To evoke a phrase from baseball's greatest manager, "Never give up on a player until you know whom you're going to replace him with."
In this case, the man to replace Jack Leggett is Tim Corbin, who seems to have inherited some decent Leggett qualities, but has retained the ability to have an original thought, which distinguishes him from his former boss. The time to make the move is soon, if Clemson has any interest in playing winning baseball again.

